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Abstract
Since the calls to view accounting as a cultural defined discipline Geertz’s work yields
significant debate from accounting scholars. This review paper argues that Geertz á la
interpretive anthropology has been inaccurately discerned by many accounting
methodologists. They overlook the theoretical anchoring Geertzian conception of
culture schemes - “by isolating its elements”, “internal relationships”, and “in some
general way” - that illustrate accounting as a kind of being of knowing – the form of
what accounting comes to. The paper traces the implications of this on fundamental
consequences for accounting research methodology and establishes direction to critic
with a position of where the claims of Geertz should apparently held.
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Introduction
Since calls to view accounting as a culturally defined discipline Geertz’s work has
yielded significant debate amongst accounting scholars. With particular emphasis on
the local spatialities of accounting, Geertz explores the literal and metaphoric
construction of accounting as part of one particular type of alternative accounting
research. Ansari and Bell (1991) were among the earliest accounting researchers to
employ of Geertz’s arguments and used the central thrust of what Geertz calls
“interpretive anthropology” to explain accounting and organisational control systems in
the context of peculiar Urdu kinship structures. Abdul-Rahman and Goddard (1998)
utilised Geertz’s thick description in examining the sacred and the secular activities in
respect of the issue of power and accountability. This issue is extended further in
modern accounts of bapakism in Javanese society (Rasyid, 1995; Efferin & Hopper,
2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2008) which was of course the setting of much of Geertz’s
works in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973). Recent field studies such as those by
Ahrens and Mollona (2007), Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2007) and Kosmala
(2007) used Geertzian analysis to substantiate what has been codified as the practices of
frame of mind, rules-based traditions, and competitive and individualistic-group
outputs.
For a few accounting researchers (e.g. Ahrens, 1996 Rasyid, 1995), cultural
accounting research à la Geertz’s came into being as a methodological choice of
Hofstede’s software of the mind (1991) and cultural indices (1980, 2001) which have
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been employed widely in the social sciences and the accounting literature (cf.
Baskerville, 2003; Hofstede, 2003). Geertz accelerates a dromocentric world of
symbols that is believed to promote accounting as a web of intersubjective
relationships. This is ground with the acknowledgement that what emerges from
cultural studies is the theoretical basis of anthropology and sociology (Baskerville,
2003). As a result of a close relationship between accounting and anthropology (cf.
Sterling, 1970; Violet, 1983: Jonsson & Macintos, 1997; Maurer, 2002), and Geertz and
anthropology and ethnography (Geertz, 1973), it is quite natural to explain accounting
using a Geertzian analytical framework.
Although this Geertzian framework has been criticized by his opponents largely
for the notions of thick descritption and local culture (Shankman, 1984), or for the
implied belief that cost-accounting is more important than anthropology (Collville &
McAulay, 1996), there is an increasing number of recent publications in accounting
using Geertz’s work. A key theoretical advantage in this regard is that Geertz’s
interpretive cultural science is empirical. It is empirical in belonging to the narrative
mode of cognitive functioning (e.g. Baxter & Chua, 2008) and in providing instruments
for initiation and management of theoretical change (Rasyid, 1994; Jonsson &
Macintos, 1997). However, such a critical enterprise typically entails more than mere
application. The suitability of Geertz’s work requires appraisal. The current review
paper argues that, either as proponents or opponents, Geertz á la interpretive
anthropology has been inaccurately discerned by many accounting methodologists.
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They overlook the theoretical anchoring of the Geertzian conception of culture schemes
- “by isolating its elements”, “internal relationships”, and “in some general way” - that
illustrate accounting as a kind of being of knowing, the form of what accounting comes
to be.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section is concerned with culture and
the notion of knowing. This is to tease out what is specific to Geertz by showing that
culture is imbued with many versions of the process of knowing and this includes
adaptive systems, cognitive systems, structural systems and symbolic systems. The next
second section is concerned with Geertz, his analytical framework and accounting
research and criticims. From it, the cultural conceptions of Geertz such as
methodological sleight of hand, experience-near and experience-distant are explored.
We argue that the controversial aspects of Geertz’s works significantly depend on these
although they receive little attention from accounting academics. The third section
critically evaluates this claim and demonstrates that not only culture and the process of
knowing are intertwined with each other at espistemological stage, but also, that
accounting is at the heart of knowing. The fourth section further eloborates on this by
grounding the theoretical anchoring of Geertzian conceptions of culture schemes - “by
isolating its elements”, “internal relationships”, and “in some general way”. They
provoke concepts such as self realisation and contextualisation, blurred genres, local
knowledge, and making detours and go by side roads in the process of knowing in
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which accounting is associated. The final section discusses the conclusions and the
contribution of the paper to accounting research methodology.

Capturing culture and the conception of knowing
Emanating from the German expression Kultur, “culture” was initially used in English
only after the term “civilization” emerged. The latter was a technological word and the
former was spiritual in the general sense of the word “cult”. In a premature utterance
“there was first a phase in which the two were contrasted” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn
1952, p. 15). However, history had seen fit to realize that for decades the basis for the
antithesism of this conception to the literature was not clear anyhow. Sociologists those from whom both terms were mostly referred - were blamed for ignoring the full
significance of these terms. As such, the result of rendering together these utterances
has produced a phase in which the contrast was reversed. Culture was then viewed as
being a synonym or near-synonym of civilization, and vice versa (ibid, p. 15).
Among the first to use the expression was Johann Gortfried Herder (1744-1803)
who published Ideas on the Philosophy of History of Mankind. Kroeber and Kluckhohn
(1952) observed that Herder’s philosophy of history in the account of “enlightenment”,
“tradition”, and “humanity” were the first to place culture in the humanness dictionary
“as a progressive cultivation or development of faculties” (p. 22). Parallel with this
non-aristocratic–view was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who, in Critique of Pure
Reason, made the statement that “metaphysics is the completion of the whole culture of

6

reason” (quoted in Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 24). This statement became the
grounds on which culture began to be viewed as a product or condition of more than
merely a historical development. Later, Dr Gustav E. Klemm used the word Cultur in
his ten volumes Allgemeine Culturgeschicte der Menschheit (1802-1867) and E. B.
Tylor’s substitution of Cultur for civilization in his Researches was a landmark to
further implicate both terms in one branch of study. Since this application of Tylor’s,
Klemm’s word Cultur becomes a “de facto of doing an ethnography” (Kroeber and
Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 25). As a result, until now culture is highly regarded as one of the
main branches of civilization inquiries. The works of culture in the discussion of
language, kinship-marriage, fire-making and cooking, taboo, and technology are some
of the many examples.
Capturing culture entails the process of knowing. It is due to the fact that culture
has no single and consistent definition. In everyday life the peculiar characteristic of
culture does not enable us to better describe things other than that which is actually in
our sense organs or being. But, to permit a precise description of being, which is the
main source of knowledge, is surely impossible. There are mechanisms from scientific
specification to intuition that are unexplainable. As Polanyi describes
We know a person’s face and can recognize him among a thousand, indeed among
a million. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognize a face we know (1969, p.
142)
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Polanyi argues that “to see a problem is to see something hidden that may yet be
accessible. The knowledge of a problem is, therefore, like the knowing of
unspecifiables, a knowing of more than you can tell” (1969, p. 131). As such, the
discussion of knowledge has developed a significant epistemic attachment to culture.
The central argument is, for knowing, the process is intrinsically incomplete - a reason
why culture is there (cf. Geertz, 1973, p. 29, also LeVine, 1986, p. 84). This rationality
is contained in Geertz’s quotation of Wittgenstein’s remark:
In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side roads. We see the
straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is
permanently closed (Geertz, 1983, p. 92, also p. 6)

Intrinsically the meaning of the “make detours…go by side roads” or any process of
knowing is the foci of culture. This interpretation is based on Goodenough (1981), a
cultural anthropologist, who suggests that any complementary human efforts - “the
necessary percepts, concepts, recipes, and skills - the things they need to know in order
to meet things that will meet the standards of their fellows” - are de facto culture (see;
p. 50, emphasis added).
Hitherto, in the Tylorian period, the diversity of these culture-knowing studies was
not fully embraced by anthropologists (cf. Geertz, 1973, p. 29; LeVine, 1986, p. 84).
The basic argument is that any attempt to define culture itself exposes the researcher to
obscurity, shadows, gloom and confusion as no satisfactory answer will be achieved as
far as it is concerned. Major cultural theorists, especially cultural adaptationists (in the
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words of Keesing, 1974), believe that it is through evolutionary perspectives in
particular ecological settings and biological foundations that culture has its best
possible justification. They argue that the built-into configuration has made a form of
culture “too intricate and too close to our eyes for us to cope with it successfully”
(Benedict, 1961, p. 39).
In contrast to this camp of cultures as adaptive systems, following Keesing (1974),
are cognitive systems, structural systems and symbolic systems. Unlike the former,
these three, which are labelled as cultures as ideational systems, and see culture as more
open, fractious and discoverable. To them, the peculiarity of culture does not mean that
culture is entirely homo sapiens determined-molecular. Culture, they believe, is learned
and not from replication (e.g. Goodenough, 1981). “Standard”, “good taste”,
“bienséance”, “correct expression” or any culture demonstration, explained Ray (2001),
are kinds of self-realisation and social triage. This is the reason why culture exists in
the trading post, the hill fort, or the sheep run, informed Geertz (1973).
On the conception of knowing, cognitive systems, structural systems and symbolic
systems do not share the same epistemological stance. The first group, commented
Keesing (1974, also 1979), perceives culture mainly, like language, “as a body of
distinctive things about a community that were transmitted by learning” (Goodenough,
1981, p. 49). The problem with this conception is that some of the very linguistic facts
may not be manageably rendered (Keesing, 1979; LeVine, 1986) and like a speech, are
vulnerable to spontaneous grammatical fault. A status of cultural heritage with no
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particular sound rules in cognitive systems seems to be “unproductive and inadequate
in the face of the staggering richness and complexity of human knowledge and
experience” (Keesing, 1974, p. 78).
The second group, which was popularized by Lévi-Strauss, originated from cultural
domains - myth, kinship, marriage and art – sees to “define phenomena under study as a
relation between two or more terms, real or supposed, construct a table of possible
permutations between these terms, and make this table the general object of analysis
which, at this level only, can yield necessary connections” (1962, p. 16, quoted in
Scholte, 1966, p. 1194). For the benefit of cognitivists, structuralists suggest that if
cultural systems are treated as languages and are systematically analyzed through
methods borrowed from linguistics, then the covert meanings of the systems may be
made explicit (Pace, 1978). This non-linguistic conception demonstrates conditions,
patterns, and, to some extent, power so that culture could be visibly comprehensible in
society, organizations, bureaucracy and any mechanism of ideologies. However, from a
broad perspective of knowledge, this philosophically rationalist position of
structuralism is confining as it appears to have an interest in the syntax rather than the
content of culture (Scholte, 1966) and in the great deal of what is-what ought to be
distinction (Nutini, 1971).
The third group, which is of interest to this paper, is from a Parsonian view of
Weber but in the language of hermeneutics, phenomenology, semiotics and literary
criticism. The foremost figures in this conception are David Schneider and Clifford
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Geertz. Both of them remark on culture as having symbols and meanings. Their
particular stances are actually the addition of the premises offered by the former
cognitive systems and structural systems. In symbolic systems, the general doctrine is
that cultures are symbolic in the sense that they are socially constructed, produced and
re-produced and for this they have the meanings, not to bind, but to explore. As
symbols and meanings are subjective and borne in the minds of systems of thinking,
Schneider and Geertz have different explications about culture. Comparison between
them can be found in Keesing (1974) and, to a lesser extent, Feinberg (1979) but both
have been enlightened, as Turner (1975), argues by, “the source of some of the most
powerful theoretical ideas in contemporary anthropology” (p. 147).
In capturing culture, we will, instead of terms such as “units” and “rules” in the
Schneiderian language, speak about symbolic systems in the view of Geertz in his The
Interpretation of Culture (1973). Although Schneider is “the driving spirit and mover of
this movement” (Turner, 1975, p. 147, also quoted in Feinberg, 1979, p. 541), we have
an interest in investigating the conception of knowing illuminated not by definition but
by following Geertz’s suggestion, “to cast light on one another” (Geertz, 2000a). As for
accounting, controversially, one “has sought to shed light on the ways in which local
concepts, artefacts, and material and spatial arrangements can be placed before a wider
background” (Ahrens, 2008, p. 294, emphasis added).
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Geertz, criticisms and accounting research
Amongst the many culture theorists, Geertz has been classified, to quote a few, “as an
introducer of sources of theoretical stimuli” (Marcus & Cushman, 1982, p. 37), as “the
anthropologist most often embraced” (Roseberry, 1982), and as “the first and only
anthropologist in the prestigious Key Contemporary Thinkers series, rubbing shoulders
with Derrida, Barthes, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Chomsky, Foucault, Bauman, Habermas
and Popper” (King, 2000, p. xii). Similar acknowledgements which are shared by his
fans and his opponents represent their interest in the works of Geertz. It is known that
they agree instead of on anthropology itself, that the major impact of Geertz’s works
[h]as actually been on practitioners and students of other academic disciplines - the
social sciences, literary studies, philosophy, and beyond (Sewell, 1997, p. 35, also
Roseberry, 1982, p. 1013)
For his celebration of Geertz’s works, in A Note on Geertz as a Cultural Paperist, it
was conceded by Rosaldo (1997) that “Geertz’s method is to enlarge the sense of
human possibilities and the conceptual range of central terms simultaneously” (p. 32).
This explains that Geertz’s purpose, as Rosaldo observes, is to see that “the problem of
the integration of cultural life becomes one of making it possible for people inhabiting
different worlds to have a genuine, and reciprocal, impact upon one another” (Geertz,
1983, p. 161). To this extent, such effort sustains Geertz not in the finding of
knowledge per se but in the act of the process of knowing.
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For this conceptualization, Geertz’s methodological practices are therefore oblique,
largely uncharted, and are subject to criticism, particularly from materialists, realists,
positivists and to a lesser extent from critical rationalists (cf. Sewell, 1997, p. 36-37;
see e.g. Ortner, 1999; 1984; Roseberry, 1982; Shankman, 1984). According to these
anthropologists, Geertz’s contributions to cultural analysis is problematic to the aim of
the social sciences which is to explain the unintended consequences of human actions
in institutional contexts (Yoshida, 2007) not in thick description as Geertz (1973)
espoused. The same vein is expressed in interpretive ethnographic accounting research
(recall Armstrong, 2008, p. 878; Tinker, 1998, p. 24) of which their concern is that
researchers are bound by their own avowed aspirations. The so-called “technology”,
“writing”, “naming”, “valuing”, that are so much about matters of accounting (cf.
Ezzamel and Hoskin, 2002; Englund, 2004; 2001) are not in an isolated world. Just as
the practices of inventing, designing, producing, marketing, advertising advocate, they
do not permit a distinct disciplinary perspective. The very notion of them is built upon
the wave of intellectual capital labelled modernization. The practice of thick-single
fieldwork of the Geertzian thus is a foreshortened version of local culture (Marcus,
1989; 1995; 1998) in which accounting-in-action is often preconceived.
In defining Geertz’s ideology, it is important to remember that Geertz’s quest is
“in an attempt somehow to understand how it is we understand understandings not our
own” (Geertz, 1983, p. 5). His thesis for culture is through interpretation inspired in
focus and perspective not in specifics (Micheelsen, 2002). In the accounting literature,
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the latter however is considered important. Thus, Ansari and Bell (1991) concentrated
accounting control systems bounded by the business family order. Rasyid (1995),
Efferin and Hopper (2007) and Tsamenyi et al. (2008) emphasized personal motivation
and individual competence. Abdul-Rahman and Goddard (1998) specialised in the
perceived concept of auditor independence. Ahrens and Mollona (2007) focused on
organisational subcultures in the characteristics of workfocers between organisational
subunits. Actually there are many insights in the works of Geertz, for example, Religion
as a Cultural System, Ideology as a Cultural System, Common Sense as a Cultural
System, After the Revolution: the Fate of Nationalism in the New States, Politics Past,
Politics Present: Some Notes on the Uses of Anthropology in Understanding the New
States, that Geertz advocates in The Interpretation of Cultures that explain the “offstage” knowledge of thick interpretation that the present paper argues is missing in
most of the ethnographic accounting literature – thereby, failing to acknowledge the
textual foundations of Geertz’s conception of culture.
This strategy, no doubt, “requires a vast amount of knowledge of objectified
social facts and mundane causal relations” (Kakkuri-knuuttila et al., 2008, p. 276). It
works into constellations through which cultural perspective in accounting can become
reality (see Dent, 1991; Kosmala, 2007). For Geertz, this mode of thickening the site of
research is not but local research with multiple sites evoked, as he summarizes
It is thus I have written about nationalism, about violence, about identity, about
human nature, about legitimacy, about revolution, about ethnicity, about
urbanization, about status, about death, about time, and most of all about
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particular attempts by particular peoples to place these things in some sort of
comprehensible, meaningful frame (Geertz, 1973; p. 30)

Another major critic comes from Geertz’s emphasis on meanings. Symbolic
anthropology of Geertzian position, argued Asad, seems to be the hiatus it accepts
between (external) symbols and (internal) dispositions, which parallels the hiatus
between “cultural system” and “social reality”. This presents the reader with a paradox:
the world of common sense is always common to all human beings (Asad, 1983, p. 250,
see Geertz, 1983, p.91). The placing of symbols in the cultural means of the Geertzian
interpretive anthropology obscures the matters of power and conflict (Asad, 1983,
Roseberry, 1982). If the argument is really about the culture of symbols, the result
places too much emphasis on timeless, over-coherent and bounded notions of culture
(Fox, 1991; Ortner, 1999; cf. Ahrens & Mollona, 2007; p. 309). According to Yoshida
(2007), this made Geertz’s interpretive anthropology serve in a way that avoids critical
discussion. There are a number of grounds behind these debates among the many
descriptions that Geertz implicitly inscribes in his papers, to those of his criticizers was
the declaration that he had made previously, viz
But one will not find very much in the way of “the theory and methodology of
interpretation” (to give the dictionary definition of the term) in what follows, for I
do not believe that what “hermeneutics” needs is to be reified into a para-science, as
epistemology was, and there are enough general principles in the world already
(Geertz, 1983, p. 5)
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It is in these ways, espousing the meaning and relying on the “methodological sleight
of hand” (ibid, p. 23), that Geertz sees culture. On the grounds of this conception,
Geertz’s aim is to explicate the meaning of culture to be inscribed; it is not that
“establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking genealogies,
mapping fields, keeping a diary, and so on1” (ibid, p. 6) like Malinowski’s “a get-it-allin approach to ethnography” (Geertz, 1988, p. 84), but, self realisation and
contextualisation - the notion where it should be related to interpretation - the process
of knowing Geertz. To quote Geertz
You can study different things in different places, and some things – for example,
what colonial domination does to established frames of moral expectation – you can
best study in confined localities. But that doesn’t make the place what it is you are
studying (ibid, p. 22)

Implicit in this conception is the fact that culture is a strange science (ibid, p. 29) and
hitherto Geertz understands that meaning, which is the wellspring of culture, “was not
locked away in actors’ heads but was embodied in publicly available symbols” (Sewell
1997, p. 39). This notion which is enacted from the idea that culture is public because
meaning is (Geertz, 1973, p 12) at the same time reflects consequently the method of
his interpretation. For Geertz, interpretation is necessary although it is often accused of
being designed to create an individual’s own environment (Putnam, 1983). This is
because interpretation could appear either as the language of reason (Habermasian
1

Interestingly, although Geertz is claimed to be the most prominent anthropologies and the source of
many ethnographic studies, the fact is, there are no particular sections on these modi operandi in any of
his books.
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Deleted:

approach), or, as the language of being (Gadamerian approach). While both are
interconnected, just as with the reason and being themselves, both have different
epistemological implications (see How, 1995, Chapter 7) for the way culture is viewed.
Unlike many of his critics, Geertz, following the notion of Gilbert Ryle’s “thick
interpretation” (Geertz, 1973, p. 6) and Paul Ricoeur’s concept of “inscription” (Geertz,
1983, p. 31), prefering to adopt the latter one. This is shown in what he terms
“interpretive anthropology” (ibid, p. 7). As Rosaldo (1997) observes
In “Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought,” Geertz explores the
analytical analogies of gaming, staging, and reading. In relation to gaming, he
discusses Erving Goffman; to theatre, a synthesis of Victor Turner and Kenneth
Burke; to reading, Paul Ricoeur, Alton Becker, and himself (p. 31)

These notions of life, gaming, staging and reading are Geertz’s attempt to come to
terms with the diversity of the ways human beings construct their lives in the act of
leading them (Geertz, 1983). In this he disagrees with cultural adaptationists (refer to
the first section of this paper); Geertz’s view is not limited strictly speaking to beings
as the primitives, tribes or groups that we observe. Instead, he refers to the being-inthe-world concept, the world that is not but the meanings that are attached with the self.
This is understandable as his most basic view of interpretive anthropology is from the
concept he borrowed from Heinz Kohut, and called “experience-near” and “experiencedistant” in contrast to becoming or mimicking natives (Geertz, 1973, p. 13).
Both concepts Geertz illuminated in his drawing of the “being” of Javanese,
Balinese and Moroccan in From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of
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Anthropological Understanding. For experience-near, he used to portray the “alus” in
Java, “first, second, third-born” and “Brahman” in Bali, and “Nisba” in Morocco; in
respect of experience-distant, “batin and lair”, “birth-order names” and “genealogy”
respectively2. Under these concepts, Geertz explains
An experience-near concept is, roughly, one that someone - a patient, a subject, in
our case an informant - might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what
he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on, and which he would readily
understand when similarly applied by others. An experience-distant concept is
one that specialists of one sort or another - an analyst, an experimenter, an
ethnographer, even a priest or an ideologist – employ to forward their scientific,
philosophical, or practical aims (Geertz, 1983, p. 57)

Clearly, this interpretation as “being” is to argue that culture is discerned as “a context,
something within which they can be intelligibly - that is, thickly - described” (Geertz,
1973, p. 14) and “they are, thus, fictions; fictions, in the sense that they are “something
made,” “something fashioned” - the original meaning of fictiō - not that they are false,
unfactual, or merely “as if” thought experiments. But the one is as much a fictiō - ‘a
making’ - as the other” (ibid, p. 15, 16).
For this sense of free will and choice in interpretation (methodology), and by
treating the temporal concepts of experience (near and distant) as the common
reference of culture, Geertz is seen to espouse the notion of culture-as-text. It is not that
text is culture but the conditions which are uncovered in which human beings have had

2

Those concepts of experience-near and experience-distant however, admitted Geertz, are a matter of
“relationship”, subjected to illuminating exercising. As an example, “‘fear’ is experience-nearer than
‘phobia’, and ‘phobia’ experience-nearer than ‘ego dyssyntonic’” (cf. Geertz, 1983, p. 57).
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their cultures. This is apparent in his most controversial work in Deep Play: Notes on
the Balinese Cockfight (Marcus & Cushman, 1982, p. 38; Roseberry; 1982, p. 1017;
Schneider, 1987, p. 814; King, 2000, p. xii).
However, this does not mean that Geertz has grossly ignored the culture fact.
Although Roseberry “calls into question the metaphor of culture as text” (1982, p.
1019), and also from others who assert his novelties as the seduction and destruction of
anthropology (e.g. Asad, 1983; Fox, 1991; Biernacki, 1999; Ortner, 1999), the fact is
Culture is not “there, “waiting demurely to be discovered. Instead, culture - an
explicit conceptual orientation that provides the purpose and rationale for doing
ethnography - gets there because the ethnographer puts it there (Wolcott, 1995, p.
86, emphasis in original)

Underlying this conceptualization of culture as a text is the position of symbolic
systems for which Geertz had a long explanation in The Interpretation of Culture as a
source of illumination of the penetration of accounting in an interpretive mode of
thinking and as a cultural system. Below, we detail this point.

On knowing and accounting
Doing accounting is a kind of self realisation (see; Lavoie, 1987; Hines 1988; 1991;
Morgan, 1988; Manicas, 1993, Fischer, 1996; Preston et. al., 1996; Preston & Young;
2000; Warren, 2005). Although it is accepted as a kind of knowledge of disciplined
practice (Porter, 1992), accounting can reach beyond the contexts in which it originally
arose. It is understood that the existence of accounting by its very nature is not in an
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unattached form, but as knowledge, in the companion. All too frequently, the complex
interlinkages of accounting are found in many guises of representations (Davis et al.,
1982; Hayes, 1983; Morgan, 1988; Boland, 1989).
One way of grasping this banal idea is symbolic systems, the epistemological
import of a Geertzian conception of culture. Symbolic systems seek to accommodate
self realisation and contextualisation with the meanings which are central for human
beings. It is understood, according to Blumer, that “human beings act toward things on
the basis of the meanings that the things have for them” (1969, p. 2). Understandably,
this, of course, is not done and cannot be done without acknowledging that
But meanings can only be “stored” in symbols (Geertz, 1973, p.127; also Blumer,
1969)

The insight of this dictum is important. The fundamental point is that symbolic
interaction involves interpretation of the action (Blumer, 1969) and this applies to
accounting also. Interpretatively accounting is a set of symbols. To detail, it is observed
that
The word symbol derives from Greek roots which combine the idea of sign, in the
sense of a mark, token, insignia, means of identification, with that of a throwing
and putting together. A symbol is a sign which denotes something much greater
than itself, and which calls for the association of certain conscious or unconscious
ideas, in order for it to be endowed with its full meaning and significance. A sign
achieves the status of a symbol when it is interpreted, not in terms of strict
resemblance with what is signified, but when other patterns of suggestion and
meaning are “thrown upon” or “put together” with the sign to interpret it as part
of a much wider symbolic whole. Symbols are signs which express much more
than their intrinsic content; they are significations which embody and represent
some wider pattern of meaning (Morgan et al., 1983, p. 4-5)
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Although perhaps unintentional, this description of symbols, in itself, is aptly referred
to as accounting. In A Systematic View of the History of the World of Accounting, Lee
acknowledges that “the process of representational development in the world of
accounting in the earliest civilizations appears to have been based on symbols with a
designated meaning” (1990, p. 79). Much can be said about it as allegoric and
metaphoric, albeit a more careful analysis can be gleaned as earlier, as the history of
pre-writing3.
Mattessich (1994) has shown that in olden times, according to Schmandt-Besserat’s
works, of the thousands of prehistorical tokens, tablets, and pictographs in the Near
East, there is a sign of writing and accounting constitution. This discovery began with
the appreciation of the three evolution phases of counting; the one-to-one
correspondence, the concrete counting, and the abstract counting that SchmandtBesserat has insightfully sketched from her 8,000 BC to 3,000 BC materials. Extending
these points “from an accountant’s point of view” (ibid, p. 17), from those materials,
Mattessich then drew on the genesis of “double”, “entry”, “recording”, “debtor”,
“creditor”, “resource”, “owner”, “input”, “output”, “equivalent”, and “unit” - those

3
It is understood from the historical point of view that “writing” is amongst the first technologies
(Franklin, 2002), amongst the first structures (Foucault, 1970; Goody, 1986), and amongst the first
constructions (seeing that the “text” in writing is “given”) of knowledge. Writing is presented either as
voice, action, myth, epic, tragedy, conversation, etc. These demonstrate that writing is appropriately
celebrated as “symbolically meant”. Admittedly, by this epistemological position, in line with foregoing
consideration to perceive accounting as symbolic, the history of writing and pre-writing we relate to be
therefore as a mean of the discussion.
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significance symbols4 of “accounting” – the physical reality and social reality (cf.
Mattessich, 1989). These inscriptions, and potential future discoveries, were fortuitous
in Schmandt-Besserat’s works. In her involvement with the pre-writing history she
“was originally not searching for but rather stumbled on the origin of accounting”
(Mattessich, 1994, p. 7).
Acknowledging this finding as informative but perspectival, Schmandt-Besserat’s
discovery is subjected subsequently to Ezzamel and Hoskin’s theoretical inquiry, “to
re-ask the age-old question: what is accounting” (Ezzamel & Hoskin, 2002, p. 334).
Arguing from the works of Foucault and Derrida they found that those ancient tokens
represent as well the technology of naming, counting and valuing objects, which
interiorly emerge in the practice of accounting but are mixed somehow in the writing
and its allegories. This pragmatic view is the result of their extension of the
supplementing function of accounting from writing (as in the previous view of
Mattessich) to money. In the conclusion they remarked
This is why it is within accounting that intrinsic value lies, since it is accounting
as naming and counting practice and as a visible sign which identifies the
possibility that there is a value to be signified in the first instance. But once this
money of account emerges, it becomes the “currency” through which definable
value is expressed (ibid, p. 360, emphasis in original)
Although they observe that “there is no prior presence, e.g. the invisible arche-writing,
behind signs, such as tokens, as the guarantee of meaning”, nonetheless they agree that

4

For the modest but concrete analysis of accounting and symbols inextricability see Craswell (1978).
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a first form of accountability was enacted from these tokens (ibid, p. 346). Implicit in
this premise is the fact that “the accounting record is then always open to revision and
reinterpretation, so long as it survives, and thus partakes in a process of valuing and
revaluing” (ibid, p. 359).
Seen from the outcomes of this research, by theory, practice and technology, the
view that accounting is peripherally symbolic is not opposed but supported. For this,
the Geertzian conception of culture and interpretation of symbols and meanings are
thus applicable. However, further tests on this assertion are needed. The argument that
inasmuch as it is symbolic, accounting hence entails interpretation, which by no means
nonetheless indicates that for accounting the “making visible is akin to merely shining
a light on something that was simply there but hidden” (Boland, 1987, p. 271). In his
discussion of Miller and O’Leary (1987), Boland (1987) points out that in the
conception of cost accounting we inevitably bring the domain of power in our life to
the idea of invention that is present and should be noticed therefore. The preceding
analyses of Mattessich (1994) and Ezzamel and Hoskin (2002), to our understanding,
have most appropriately referred to what Boland means. While Mattesich expresses “in
knowing [reading: the accounting perspective] we bring object into being” (Boland,
1987; p. 271, emphasis added), Ezzamel and Hoskin recognize that “in knowing
[reading: the accounting perspective] we also bring them into a power relationship”
(ibid, p. 271, emphasis added, also Chua, 1995, p. 114).
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Such concerns of “object”, “bring into being”, and “relationship” indicate that the
enterprise of “the interpretation of interpretations” (Lavoie, 1987) that is employed in
accounting, in essence, does imply the form of knowing. More explanation is needed
therefore as it is from these implications that this paper has drawn the meaning of
“Accounting on knowing”. However, since they are situated in the concept under the
symbolic systems (where interpretation comes from), an explanation on this is only
able to be properly understood by looking back at the notion of the symbolic systems
they themselves purportedly used to serve as the way of seeing the world as a cultural
system.

Grounding the theoretical anchoring of the Geertzian conception of culture
schemes: A methodological position
The foregoing analysis has shown that the concept of culture of Geertz and the
interpretation of meanings are derived from symbolic systems. However, when the
discussion of symbolic systems takes place, we can see then that in the process of
knowing, it is understood that “object”, “bring into being”, and “relationship” are also
included and should be realized. This is how we had illustrated accounting in its
discussion as symbolic systems. This gives an impression that in the idea of Geertz, as
a model which is to be used in this study, “object”, “bring into being”, and
“relationship” should not be precluded from discussions therefore; the Geertzian

24

conception of culture should have these. Not being able to ignore this as the essence of
cultural analysis, Geertz details
Culture is most effectively treated, the argument goes, purely as symbolic system
(the catch phrase is, “in its own terms”), by isolating its elements, specifying the
internal relationships among those elements, and then characterizing the whole
system in some general way” (1973, p. 17, emphasis added)

The view of this treatment, for the benefit of discussion, is given in Figure 1. Note
that, the above three clauses that we have underscored; “by isolating its elements”,
“internal relationships” and “in some general way”, are in the middle section. They are
flanked by two subheadings. The left, as discussed, contains social constitutions of
accounting in the constellation of knowing, the right contains the methodological
position of Geertz labelled “game of contextualization and self realization”, “making
detours, go by side roads” and “blurred genres” (Geertz, 1973, 1983).

On knowing

Geertzian Conception of Culture
Symbolic systems
Methodological position
Object
By isolating its elements
“Game of contextualisation and
self realisation”, “blurred
genres”
Bring into being
Internal relationships
“Local knowledge”
“Making detours, go by side
Relationship
(e.g. In some general way
power, politics, etc.)
roads”
Figure 1: On knowing, accounting and Geertz

Further discussion on the extent of Geertz’s conception, focusing on its methodological
position, in an attempt to locate accounting amid the knowing process, is detailed
below.
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“by isolating its elements”
Understanding accounting as culture as Geertz understands, involves interpretation. In a
treatise of culture, interpretation is necessary as culture itself involves social
constructions and multiple translations. The whole point here is culture according to
Geertz is “an interpretive one in search of meaning” (1973, p. 5). In making
interpretations, Geertz seems to believe in no absolute methodology. For him, the most
effectively treated version of culture is purely as symbolic system (the catch phrase is,
“in its own terms”)” (ibid, p. 17). This, in the first place, creates this concern: “by
isolating its elements”.
Arguing from the process of a knowing perspective and from the self construction
of reality (or being), such penetration is justifiable. Following Geertz
[t]here has been an enormous amount of genre mixing in intellectual life in recent years;
and it is, such blurring of kinds, continuing apace (Geertz, 1983, p. 19)

The grounding of “by isolating its elements” is a “game of contextualisation and self
realisation” as a result of what Geertz called “blurred genres”. It is understood that as
with other human sciences, styles of presentations of accounting vary greatly in content
and form. To this extent, to repeat, self realisation and contextualisation in accounting
is necessary (cf. Boland and Pondy, 1983; Tomskin and Groves, 1983; Chua, 1986;
Boland, 1993; Hopper et al., 1987; Jönsson, 1987; Lavoie, 1987; Morgan, 1988).
However, there is no accounting without the extrinsic sources of information (Geertz,
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1973, p. 92). Before accounting comes to imagination and ideas, someone has to
establish the index of subjective meanings (Berger and Luckmann, 1971, p. 50, also
Searle, 1995), which is influenced in the very distinct, but intertwined character – the
blurred one. Whether it is a “company”, “annual report”, “machinery”, “money”, or
“bank”, each in essence is essentially with character, purpose and meaning. Each has
the potential to offer accounting that is open, provocative, and with potential. Each
offers freedom to shape accounting that could range blurredly from “financial
information” to “people talking accounting” (e.g. Jönsson and Solli, 1993; Ahrens,
1997).

Each seeks to establish accounting with a set of contextualisations of

characteristics, features and assumptions so to have a precondition that ensure
An important element of my knowledge (reading: accounting) of everyday life is
the knowledge of the relevance structures of others…[with the reminder that] I do
not share my knowledge equally with all fellowmen, and there may be some
knowledge that I share with no one (Berger and Luckmann, 1971, p. 60, emphasis
added)
“internal relationships”
One aspect that we have to realise is that self realisation and contextualisation could not
be done totally outside common sense. There are two reasons at least to support this
fact to accounting. First, in contextualising accounting one will relate within that which
makes sense and within which everyday life has meaning. Second, within the clusters
of contextualisations of accounting one has a sensitivity more towards the society (or
world) to which he or she belongs. Such, observed Geertz, is credible since
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[t]he notion that there are some things that all men will be found to agree upon
(reading: on accounting) as right, real, just, or attractive and that these things are,
therefore, in fact right, real, just, or attractive-was present …and probably has
been present in some form or another in all ages and climes. It is one of those
ideas that occur to almost anyone sooner or later (1973, p. 38-39)

This implies that accounting is common as culture is public. However, to scrutinise, the
sentence “culture is public” is not identical however with “public is culture” as in the
public to which culture is referred, there is still room for individual expression, for
example, “in the trading post, the hill fort, or the sheep run” (ibid, p. 16). To this extent,
public is common but diverse.
Common sense is not a fortunate faculty, like perfect pitch; it is a special frame of
mind, like piety or legalism. And like piety or legalism (or ethics or cosmology),
it both differs from one place to the next and takes, nevertheless, a characteristic
form (Geertz, 1983, p. 11, emphasis added)

This view, common sense but in a special frame of mind, is not inconsistent. Indeed it
contains the basis of culture.
“Culture” thus articulates the tension between two antithetical concepts of
identity: it tells us to think of ourselves as being who we are because of what we
have in common with all the other members of our society or community, but it
also says we develop a distinctive particular identity by virtue of our efforts to
know and fashion ourselves as individuals (Ray, 2001, p. 3)

The critical view is that although contextualisation sets the scene and introduces the
ideas and imaginations as common sense, one definitely has to get inside the defining
process of the object to know what it is. This knowing process entails “internal
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relationships”, the relationship that “takes us into the heart of that of which it is the
interpretation” (Geertz, 1973, p. 18).
The grounding of “internal relationships” is “local knowledge”. Accounting, it has
long been argued in the previous section, is a self realisation discipline. Not only that,
because accounting is also the reference for symbolic interpretation (refer Mattessich,
1989; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1990; Lee, 1990; Ansari & Bell, 1991; Mattessich, 1994;
Ezzamel & Hoskin, 2002), it is through local knowledge that notions emerge; such as
“debtor”, “creditor”, “resource”, “owner”, etc. The key point of this internalisation is:
accounting is to give a value to such notions as “standard”, “morality”, “spirituality”,
“ethicality”, “rationality”, and the like (Neimark & Tinker, 1986; Arrington &
Schweiker, 1992; Merino, 1993). This is because, in the presence of doing accounting,
local conditions like “good investors”, “high liquid assets”, “low risk investments”, are
critical. They exist as a result of internalisations of such local interrelated accounting
concepts. Although self realisation and contextualisation formulate indication, it is
through local knowledge that accounting may operate as nouns, verbs, adjectives,
adverbs, or as longer idiomatic phrases. Local knowledge deals with the space of
discovery of the new insights of accounting that are embedded and implicit.

“in some general way”
According to Geertz, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself
has spun” (1973, p. 5). In his The Interpretation of Culture, the “webs of meaning”,
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“thick description”, “deep play”, “the confusion of tongues”, and the “said of social
discourse”, are all that he had inscribed and were “to cause them to cast light on one
another” (Geertz, 2000a, p. viii-xi), not in a specific but “in some general way”. The
view of “in some general way” is with the premise “the understanding of
understanding” (Geertz, 1983, p. 5). Culture for Geertz is not to find the straight
meaning as “knowing how to wink is winking” (Geertz, 1973, p. 12), but to make
available to us answers that others have derived. This mode of treatment indeed we had
mentioned in the fist page of this paper in Geertz’s quotation of Wittgenstein’s remark,
prescribed as, “in the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side roads”
(Geertz, 1983, p. 92, also p. 6). It is from this way of thinking that interpretation exists
in different concrete settings, in different positions, and in different analytical elements.
As, in an ongoing life, Geertz argues
But if the view is settled, the way to bring it to practical existence and make it
work surely is not (ibid, p. 5)

In accounting treatises, it has long been argued that the “rules are not based on logic
and scientific methods but are derived from experience and reason” (Gruneberg, 1950,
p. 162) - “in some general way”. The example of this we can see in such constructs like
“depreciation”, “entities”, “profit”, or “methods”, which certainly reflect a growing
body of beliefs. To make any sense at all of these ways of defining accounting realities,
argues Churchman (1971), is not to come to grips with them but in some ways to make
a difference. In accounting, the practices are not rigid as one can struggle against it or
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can turn back and start over in some other ways. Admittedly, this is the reason,
explained Brief (1990), for the extent of “accounting error as a factor in business
history”.
The grounding of “in some general way” is “making detours, go by side roads”.
From such an approach, by doing so, we do not limit what we ourselves internalise
accounting in thinking but also how we externalise accounting in the everyday life, the
ongoing production of knowledge. This certainly will build up the joint actions from
someone who regards that as accounting on what he wants, or at least generates the
interest of others. The “in some general way” takes place so as to remind us that in one
sense nobody can be “being” in the past. As we can see, the histories of the
contribution of accounting in the railways, constructions, wars and agricultures do not
have a constant and well defined “object”. Because of that, internalisation or local
knowledge only is not enough. Accounting knowledge is between “experience” (“being
in space”) and “reason”, scattered and uncharted. To do that is to make a connection, a
relationship and so on from the world out and here, just like making detours, go by side
roads.

Concluding Remarks
This paper shares the view that Geertz’s penetration of symbolic systems is
controversial (Asad, 1983; Fox, 1991; Biernacki, 1999; Marcus & Cushman, 1982;
Ortner, 1999; 1984; Roseberry, 1982; Shankman, 1984, Yoshida, 2007). The grounds

31

on which Geertz based his ideology for culture is local and bounded. Critics accuse
Geertz of using the “objects” to thickly describe a science of symbolic action within
which the thinking is “located”. Because of the economic power wielded through the
medium of accounting, the kind of theory developed in the course of ethnographic
interpretation à la Geertz is therefore short-range and situation-specific (cf. Armstrong,
2008).
In our reading of Geertz, we argue that interpretive anthropology a la Geertz has
been inaccurately interpreted by many accounting methodologists. They overlook the
theoretical anchoring of Geertzian conceptions of culture schemes which are
determined “by isolating its elements”, assessing “internal relationships”, and viewed
“in some general way”. This paper illustrates how symbolic systems and Geertz were
discussed to ground a number of basic ideas in accounting. It is understood that Geertz
was aware that focus and perspective can reach beyond the contexts in which they
originally arose (see Geertz, 1996). For Geertz, the most important use of his
interpretation of cultures “is to connect them in such a way as to cause them to cast
light on one another” (2000a, p. xi). This quest he called “interpretive anthropology” –
“an attempt somehow to understand how it is we understand understandings not our
own” (1983, p. 5).
In the context of accounting, this review helps to show a more appropriate use of
Geertz’s works in a way where they can be used to approach accounting through a more
inner correspondence of communal sensibilities. There are of course issues of locality
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in accounting (cf. Lukka & Kasanen, 1996). However, what Geertz actually meant by
the words of “local knowledge” is “local not just as to place, time, class, and variety of
issue, but as to accent - vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to
vernacular imaginings of what can” (Geertz, 1983; p. 215; 2000b, p. 133-134).
Accounting embodies a localised set of social institutions, social actors, property rights,
products, transactional relationships, trade practices, and these are framed by a wide
variety of factors, including, but not limited to, “purely economics” and “market
forces”. Culture in accounting is uniquely defined by the domination of a certain
oddities. Whether it be a management accounting, costing, taxation, or legal and
regulated accounting practice , it is necessary to place such singularities in an informed
proximity, and this follows the methodological position of “by isolating its elements”,
“internal relationships”, and “in some general way”. These are integral elements to
Geertz, and should anyone criticise Geertz the challenges must be respect of them. This
would enable reasoned and appropriate criticism and avoid some of the inaccurate
criticism we have observed in the accounting literature.
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